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Abstract: In this paper I present a summary and analysis of the existing literature 
surrounding the democratic peace theory. I argue that due to methodological 
gaps in the conceptualization of the theory, empirical evidence has so far yielded 
non definitive results. This is due to two crucial factors; the first is that proponents 
tend to mistakenly present democracy as a dichotomous variable, and the 
second is that other independent variables are often empirically inseparable from 
democracy. I hypothesize that by re-conceptualizing democracy as a measurable 
rather than dichotomous variable, we will be better equipped to determine 
whether or not the observed relationship between democracy and a reduction in 
militarized interstate disputes is a causal relationship or a mere correlation. 
 
Résumé: Dans cet article, je présente un résumé ainsi qu’une analyse de la 
littérature existante au sujet de la théorie de la paix démocratique. En raison de 
lacunes méthodologiques dans la conceptualisation de la théorie, les études 
empiriques ont jusqu'ici donné des résultats non définitifs. Je soutiens que cela 
est dû à deux facteurs: d’une part, ses promoteurs font fausse piste en 
présentant la démocratie comme une variable dichotomique et, d’autre part, ils 
oublient l’importance de variables indépendantes tiers qui sont souvent 
empiriquement inséparables de la notion de démocratie. Je pose l'hypothèse 
que, par la re-conceptualisation de la démocratie comme une variable mesurable 
plutôt que dichotomique, nous serons ainsi mieux équipés à déterminer si la 
relation observée entre la notion de démocratie et la réduction des conflits inter-
étatiques militarisés constitue une relation de cause à effet ou une simple 
corrélation. 
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In recent years, western countries (but more specifically U.S. governments) have 
cited the democratic peace theory, an unproven and increasingly vulnerable 
ideological framework, as prime justification for their foreign policy. At the most 
basic level, the theoretical underpinnings of the democratic peace are based on 
the supposed existence of a causal relationship between democracy and a 
reduction in the propensity to go to war. It stems from a positivist epistemological 
approach in that it seeks to establish a law that democracy necessarily reduces 
likelihood of warfare, which according to proponents, is due to pacifistic 
behaviour stemming from the normative and institutional characteristics of 
democratic states.1  
The theoretical debates on the issue emerge at the most basic definitional 
level. Proponents tend to define democracy along normative lines, with relatively 
arbitrary concepts. According to John M. Owen, a democracy is “a state that 
instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant ideology”.2 For 
critics on the other side of the spectrum, the concept of democracy tends to be 
much more concrete. According to Schwartz and Skinner, a democracy can be 
defined along six objective criteria, mainly “broad adult suffrage, competitive 
elections, the usual civil liberties, the rule of law, equality before the law, and a 
fair measure of either popular choice or legislative control over the executive.”3 
                                                 
 
 
1 Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political 
Science Review 97 (2003): 586-587. 
2 John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security 19 (1994): 
89. 
3 Thomas Schwartz & Kiron Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” Orbis 46 (2002): 161. 
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Furthermore, definitional inconsistencies, particularly the differences between the 
abstract and concrete conceptualizations, will be a crucial point of analysis. 
Although empirical studies have demonstrated a clear and incontestable 
correlation between democracy and a reduction in the likelihood of Militarized 
Interstate Disputes4 (MIDs), the central issue is proving that this correlation 
amounts to a causal relationship between the two variables. To this end, 
proponents must establish through empirical evidence that variations in MIDs 
between states (the dependent variable) are directly and necessarily caused by 
variations in the governmental systems of these same states (the independent 
variable).5 Critics who reject the theory do so with three central arguments. The 
first is that due to ambiguities surrounding the definitions of key terms like 
democracy, the theory cannot be reliably tested because the object of analysis is 
too vaguely and arbitrarily defined.6 Secondly, due to historical contradictions of 
democratic states going to war, the theory has already been disproved.7 Finally, 
many scholars assert that peace among democratic states is not caused by 
democracy, but by other independent variables such as modernity,8 cultural 
                                                 
 
 
4 Lars E. Cederman & Mohan P. Rao, “Exploring the Dynamics of the Democratic Peace”, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 818-833. 
5 Proponents must establish that democracy necessarily causes a reduction in MIDs because the 
positivist epistemological nature of the theory requires the establishment of a clearly defined law 
of human or state interactions. If democracy doesn’t always reduce the likelihood of MIDs, then 
the theory, with its current positivist undertones, would not hold. 
6 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 160-162. 
7 Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory,” 558. 
8 Azar Gat, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity,” World Politics 
58 (2005): 73-100. 
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factors9, economic development10 or even a natural affinity among democratic 
states stemming from a mixture of these variables.11 Keeping these critiques in 
mind, proponents of the democratic peace conceptualize the theory with two 
distinct models of analysis.  
The first is the static model, which simply seeks to establish a direct 
causal relationship between democracy and a reduction in the likelihood of MIDs. 
Using a propositional calculus methodology12 and a complex subsequent game 
theory analysis, Zinnes argues that a dyad of democracies does not engage in 
MIDs because their mutual pacifistic characteristics, stemming from their 
democratic nature, creates a non zero-sum interaction.13 On the other hand, 
dyads of democratic and authoritarian states do engage in MIDs because the 
actions taken by authoritarian regimes create a zero-sum interaction,14 
compromising the security of democratic states and forcing them to engage in 
MIDs.15 The basic static model has two crucial implications, one at the micro and 
the other at the macro levels. Looking first at the micro analysis, the model 
                                                 
 
 
9 Errol A. Henderson, “The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989,” 
International Studies Quarterly 24 (1998): 461-484. 
10 Michael Mousseau, “Market Propensity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (2000): 472-507. 
11 Eric Gartzke, “Preference and the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 44 
(2000): 191-212. 
12 Propositional calculus refers to a form of mathematical logic dealing with the relationship 
between formed propositions disregarding their internal structures. For example, A1 causes A2 
which in turn causes A3. The internal structures of the variables are disregarded. 
13 In game theory, a non zero-sum game refers to a situation whereby the sum of the gains and 
losses of participants do not equal 0. In other words, both parties can gain from the interaction. 
Hence both participants can be winners. 
14 In game theory, a zero sum game refers to a situation whereby the sum of the gains and losses 
of participants is equal to 0. This means than one party’s gains are exactly matched by another 
party’s losses. Hence, there must be a winner and a loser. 
15 Dina A. Zinnes, “Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace Puzzle,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 432-441.  
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implies, as mentioned above, that a dyad of states sharing a common form of 
democratic government will not engage in MIDs. The macro implication is more 
interesting, implying that peace and stability in the world system is dependent on 




N = the number of states in the international system 
M = the number of non democratic states in the international system 
T = threat level in terms of MIDs within the international system  
T = (M[N – M] + M[M – 1])/2 
 
Accordingly, if M = 0, then T = 0, implying that if all states within the system are 
democratic, then there would be no threat of war.16 Similarly, the lower the M / N 
ratio, the lower the threat of war. At face value, this theory mounts a strong 
defence against one of the most prominent criticisms of the theory; the historical 
inconsistencies.17 After all, most of the historical contradictions cited by critics 
have taken place before the Cold War, when the number of democratic states in 
the system was much smaller, i.e. the M / N ratio was relatively high.  
Though it succeeds in addressing the historical contradictions, the static 
model is vulnerable in that it is unable to empirically prove a causal link between 
                                                 
 
 
16 Ibid., 448. 
17 Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory,” 589. 
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democracy and peace; rather, it is only successful in establishing a mere 
correlation. This stems from the fact that modern democracies also consistently 
possess other variables such as modernity and developed economies, which 
have been hypothesized themselves to create mutually pacifistic state 
characteristics and in turn reduce the likelihood of MIDs.18 Though this presents 
a difficulty, the definitional issue brought forth by Schwartz and Skinner in 
regards to the criteria used to define a democracy, specifically that democracy 
can be objectively measured in degrees (i.e. a state can be a perfect democracy 
or only somewhat a democracy) is what ultimately tears down the static model.19 
The static propositional calculus methodology is inherently flawed in that by 
definition it fails to take into account internal characteristics of its units of 
analysis. In order to do so, the model would have to introduce an additional β 
variable20 where (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) to measure the intensity of its propositions i.e. 
differentiate between perfect democracies and those that are only somewhat 
democracies. This is one of the crucial methodological and empirical gaps in the 
literature surrounding the democratic peace theory. Proponents of the theory 
tend to mistakenly treat democracy as a dichotomous variable (i.e. a state either 
is or is not a democracy); whereas a strong case can be made through which the 
democratic characteristics of a democracy can be measured. By employing a 
                                                 
 
 
18 Gat, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity,” 73-100. 
19 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 159-172. 
20 Generally in economics and game theory the β variable serves as a measure of intensity. In 
this context, for the purpose of empirical research, a “perfect democracy” would have a β value 
close to 1, whereas a state that just barely qualifies as a democracy would have β value close to 
0. 
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clear and concrete definition of democracy, as proposed by critics, future 
empirical research can establish a β value for various states, which would yield 
more empirically relevant results.21 On the other hand, using the vague 
definitions of the theory’s proponents would be quite problematic. After all, 
measuring “liberal ideas” or “liberalism” would be an empirical nightmare, and 
proponents can always argue that contradictory evidence involving MIDs 
between a dyad of democracies can be explained away by one of the states not 
being “liberal” enough and hence a non-democracy, without being subject to 
objective measurements.  
The second model is dynamic in nature, in that it introduces a new 
variable of time as an essential element of analysis.22 Proponents argue that the 
likelihood a MID between a dyad of states at time t + 1 is dependent on the state 
of affairs at time t with the inter-temporal variations being due to the fact that 
actors learn from positive experiences. According to Cederman, “in our context, 
the argument assumes that pacific relations generate benefits in terms of wealth 
and security that gradually will be factored into the decision-making calculus of 
those states capable of learning”.23 Furthermore, the model is based on two 
crucial assumptions: “first, learning implies behavioural modification over time. 
                                                 
 
 
21 The concrete definition must be used because it defines key measurable characteristics of a 
democracy such as rule of law, equality before the law, and competitive elections. These 
variables can be empirically measured with a methodology similar to that of the democracy index 
developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The data can then be extrapolated to assign a β 
value for every participating country. 
22 Lars E. Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical 
Learning Process,” The American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 12-31. 
23 Ibid., 21. 
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Second, at least in the long run, there should be a differentiation between inter-
democratic relations and all other exchanges.”24 The model, based on the 
classical stochastic model of Bush and Mosteller,25 is constructed as follows: 
 
Let: 
πt = probability of engaging in MIDs in period t 
πt+1 = probability of engaging in MIDs in period t + 1 
C = coefficient of learning,26 0 ≤ C ≤ 1 
πt+1 = (1 – C)πt 
 
 At first glance, this model provides a strong defence against critics. The 
historical inconsistencies can be explained away by the dynamics of the model, 
as it only makes sense for MIDs to take place between early democracies. 
However, due to a positive learning coefficient, the tendencies for MIDs are 
reduced as time passes, and indeed this has been the observed trend.27 The 
weakness of the model lies in the empirical gap in proving that C is indeed a 
function of democracy. Though between mutual democracies the likelihood of 
                                                 
 
 
24 Ibid., 19. 
25 Robert R. Bush & Frederick Mosteller, Stochastic Models for Learning (New York: Wiley, 1955), 
1-365. 
26 In this context, the C coefficient refers to a factor that determines how much positive learning is 
taking place in a given period. The underlying assumption is that for a dyad of democracies, the C 
value will be high, causing the likelihood of MIDs to decrease drastically from period to period. 
For non-democratic states, the C value will be much smaller or even negative, resulting in a much 
slower process, or even, if negative, increasing the likelihood of MIDs from period to period. 
27 Cederman & Rao, “Exploring the Dynamics of the Democratic Peace,” 824. 
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MIDs has indeed gone down significantly, the assumption by Cederman and Rao 
that the reduction of MIDs is due to the effects of democracy is in line with the 
constant theme of the literature; proponents consistently confuse correlation with 
causation.28 What’s more, the model doesn’t account for why the likelihood of 
MIDs for democratic and non-democratic states alike have fallen sharply. 
Alternative explanations are many, for example, according to Gat: “the modern 
transformation accounts for the fact that not only liberal/democratic countries but 
all countries, once swept by the industrial-technological age, engaged in war far 
less than they previously did, a fact overlooked by the democratic peace 
theorists”.29  
Whether it is the static or the dynamic conceptualizations, the crucial 
methodological and empirical gaps in the literature arise from definitional 
inconsistencies and an inability to isolate the democracy variable.30 I hypothesize 
that by re-conceptualizing democracy as a measurable non-dichotomous 
variable, we could take potentially crucial steps to fill these gaps. Firstly, in order 
to achieve empirically relevant data, democracy must be defined clearly and 
objectively. Though proponents may argue that this conceptualization does not 
take into account the “liberalism” of a state, defining democracy along such 
arbitrary lines with such vague concepts  makes the theory “vacuous: there can 
                                                 
 
 
28 Ibid., 823-824. 
29 Gat, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity,” 98. 
30 As previously mentioned, this difficulty stems from the fact that democracies tend to also be 
economically developed, modern and culturally similar. For that reason when observing a 
correlation between democracy and a reduction in MIDs, we’re also observing a correlation 
between a reduction in MIDs and the aforementioned variables. 
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be no disconfirming evidence, but for that very reason there also can be no 
confirming evidence”.31 From the described objective definition, I propose 
developing the aforementioned β variable as a measure of democracy. This new 
dimension would be a potentially crucial addition to the literature by allowing for 
the separation of the democracy variable from other independent variables.32 The 
consequences for the existing literature would be rather interesting. The static 
model would have to move to an increasingly complex game theory model and 
explore the internal characteristics of its variables. The consequences for the 
dynamic model are much more exiting. If the data were to show that the learning 
coefficient and the inter-temporal reduction in likelihood of MIDs is independent 
of the β variable, then there would be sufficient grounds to conclude that the 
observed correlation is caused by another independent variable. However, if the 
opposite were shown to be true (i.e. a dyad with high β values has a higher 
learning coefficient), then we could reliably conclude that democracy is indeed 
the crucial factor which reduces MIDs. From this point we could potentially 
dissect and reconstruct the learning coefficient as a function of β. For example, in 
a dyad of two democratic states: 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
31 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 161. 
32 If the empirical data were to show that states with a high β (almost perfect democracies) and 
states with a low β (barely democracies) were just as likely as any other dyad of democracies to 
experience a reduction in MIDs, then we could safely conclude that it is another independent 
variable and not democracy which causes this reduction. On the other hand, if only dyads of 
states with high β values experienced a reduction in MIDs, than the democratic characteristics of 
those states may indeed be the crucial factor. 
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Let: 
D1 = state 1, β1 = level of democracy in state 1 
D2 = state 2, β2 = level of democracy in state 2 
C(β1, β2) = β1 x β2 
 
The 20th century offers several potential case studies that would be quite 
useful in exploring the above hypothesis. In 1915, the idea of Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom in a political and economic union would have been 
laughable. Of course, the question is whether or not this diplomatic 
rapprochement was caused by the liberalization and democratization of 
institutions in these countries during the twentieth century. Elsewhere in the 
Middle East, the region’s three great democracies (Turkey, Lebanon and Israel) 
have generally avoided large scale war. Turkey and Israel maintained good 
relations throughout the late twentieth century, and Lebanon, despite significant 
pressure, did not participate in the wars of 1967 and 1973. However, by 2012, 
relations between Turkey and Israel have largely deteriorated, and as recently as 
2006 Hezbollah and Israel had engaged in a month long war. Has this 
deterioration in relations been due to de-liberalization or the weakening of 
democratic institutions? Perhaps there are other more complex variables at play? 
By studying the evolution of democratic institutions in these countries, and 
observing the evolution of diplomatic relations, these case studies promise to 
provide some invaluable insights into the viability of the democratic peace. 
In conclusion, the proposed research hypothesis could build on the 
literature by potentially strengthening existing theories. Empirically isolating the 
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democracy variable would be a crucial step towards either proving or disproving 
its causation. On the other hand, the possibility arises that it will instead weaken 
the theoretical underpinnings of the democratic peace, prompting increased 
research into other independent variables. The research can potentially have an 
impact on International Studies as a whole, prompting either increased interest in 
the normative and institutional characteristics of a democracy as means of 
promoting peace and stability, should the theory be strengthened, or perhaps 
accepting the plurality of governmental systems as an equally valid model for 
peace, should the theory be weakened. 
 
 
